Panel Three: Implementation—What Methods, If Any, Can Be Employed To Promote the Existing Rules\u27 Attempts to Protect Private Identifier Information From Internet Access? by Leighton, The Honorable Ronald et al.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 79 Issue 1 Article 3 
November 2011 
Panel Three: Implementation—What Methods, If Any, Can Be 
Employed To Promote the Existing Rules' Attempts to Protect 
Private Identifier Information From Internet Access? 
The Honorable Ronald Leighton 
Joe Cecil 
Michael Ishakian 
Edward Felten 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
The Honorable Ronald Leighton, Joe Cecil, Michael Ishakian, and Edward Felten, Panel Three: 
Implementation—What Methods, If Any, Can Be Employed To Promote the Existing Rules' Attempts to 
Protect Private Identifier Information From Internet Access?, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 45 (2011). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol79/iss1/3 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship 
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact 
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 45 
CONFERENCE ON PRIVACY AND INTERNET 
ACCESS TO COURT FILES 
PANEL THREE:  IMPLEMENTATION—WHAT 
METHODS, IF ANY, CAN BE EMPLOYED TO 
PROMOTE THE EXISTING RULES’ ATTEMPTS 
TO PROTECT PRIVATE IDENTIFIER 
INFORMATION FROM INTERNET ACCESS? 
MODERATOR 
Hon. Ronald Leighton* 
SPEAKER 
Joe Cecil** 
PANELISTS 
Michel Ishakian1 
Edward Felten2 
Hon. Elizabeth Stong3 
Jay Safer4 
Robert Heinemann5  
Joseph Goldstein6 
 
 
JUDGE LEIGHTON:  My name is Ron Leighton.  I am a United States 
District Judge from the Western District of Washington, a member of the 
Court Administration and Case Management Committee. 
 
*  United States District Court Judge, Western District of Washington.  
** Project Director, Division of Research, Federal Judicial Center.   
 1. Chief, Public Access & Records Management Division, Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts. 
 2. Professor, Princeton University.  
 3. United States Bankruptcy Court Judge, Eastern District of New York. 
 4. Partner, Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell LLP. 
 5. Clerk of Court, Eastern District of New York. 
 6. Freelance Reporter.  
46 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
The panel we have here is the panel on implementation.  We are here to 
discuss the means and methods by which the judiciary seeks to disseminate 
information and, at the same time, protect privacy. 
When I was given responsibility by Judge Raggi for the implementation 
side of the aisle, I said this is a committee in need of a job description.  
When the other committees identified a policy, we would go to work in 
developing an appropriate method for achieving that objective—easy.  As I 
have drilled a little deeper, I have come to the conclusion that, just as the 
competing legitimate interests of the courts and its constituencies make 
policy making difficult, so too these important and oftentimes mutually 
exclusive interests make it difficult to select an appropriate method to best 
achieve what would otherwise be deemed a laudable goal. 
To help us navigate through these choppy waters, we have assembled an 
interesting and informed panel of speakers. 
To begin, we are going to ask Joe Cecil, who is a senior researcher for 
the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), to talk about a study that was just 
conducted by the FJC on unredacted Social Security numbers within the 
federal judiciary over a two-month period.  Joe? 
DR. CECIL:  Thank you, Judge Leighton. 
This is the implementation panel, and one of the things that we were 
asked to do was to determine the extent to which the protections in the rules 
to guard against improper disclosure of Social Security numbers have, in 
fact, been properly implemented.  You will recall that the attorneys are 
instructed to redact the Social Security numbers upon filing. 
Our study is essentially the study that you heard described by Peter Winn 
earlier.  It was a Google search of all the documents filed in federal court, 
district court, and bankruptcy court in November and December of this 
year.  We were looking for something that was very specific.  We were 
looking for a pattern of numbers that followed the pattern that Social 
Security numbers have, the three digits, hyphen, two digits, hyphen, four 
digits. 
The result of that search revealed about 2900 Social Security numbers in 
all the documents filed, the 10 million documents filed, during those two 
months. 
The rules themselves have some exceptions for filing of Social Security 
numbers, and it looks to us like probably about five million of those Social 
Security numbers fall under some of the exceptions.  There were numbers 
that were from the previous day’s court proceedings that were not restricted.  
Some of the documents were, in fact, filed earlier than December of 2007.  
But in the end, we got down to 2400 Social Security numbers that look like 
they are still knocking around in the system, numbers that should have been 
redacted. 
Two final points. 
First, we are talking about 2400 documents.  Some of these documents 
have more than one Social Security number.  In a large commercial 
bankruptcy, we would find documents that listed Social Security numbers 
for all of the employees that worked at the business that went bankrupt.  We 
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would find documents and financial account numbers for investors in a 
failed enterprise.  So some of these documents are really rich in Social 
Security numbers.  We estimate that about twenty percent of them have 
more than one. 
The last thing is that when we think about the 2400 Social Security 
numbers that still exist in the records, you have to keep in mind that we are 
talking about ten million records that are filed in court.  So, really, only one 
out of every 3400 documents that we examined had a Social Security 
number. 
Thank you. 
JUDGE LEIGHTON:  Joe, thank you. 
The first member of the panel to speak is Michel Ishakian.  She is the 
Chief of the Public Access and Records Management Division at the 
Administrative Office of the United States Court.  Prior to joining the 
Administrative Office, she worked as a management consultant for the EDS 
[Electronic Data Systems] Corporation and as a Foreign Service officer.  
Michel? 
MS. ISHAKIAN:  Thank you, Judge Leighton.  Good morning. 
I would like to begin by giving you a very brief overview of the 
judiciary’s electronic public access program, the mission of which is to 
facilitate and improve public access to court records and court information.  
Although I am here today to discuss access to court records through 
PACER, I would be remiss not to mention that the program is broader and 
encompasses the judiciary’s public websites, courtroom technology, and 
noticing. 
PACER was established in 1988 as a dial-up service.  In the last decade, 
through the implementation of CM/ECF—that would be the electronic case 
filing system—PACER has evolved into an Internet-based service.  In other 
words, PACER is a portal to CM/ECF, which is integral to public access.  
PACER provides access to various reports, court dockets for more than 30 
million cases, and over 500 million—that is 500 million—documents filed 
with the courts.7  This is by any standard a massive collection. 
During 2009, the program reached a new milestone, with over one 
million registered PACER accounts.  In any given year, approximately one-
third of those accounts are active, and many accounts do, in fact, have 
multiple users.  PACER has several categories of users.  They are fairly 
discrete.  Fully 75% are from the legal sector or are litigants, 10% are 
commercial users, approximately 5% are background investigators, which 
we have sorted out from commercial institutions, 2% belong to the media, 
and 2% represent academia. 
As I mentioned, PACER users are registered.  All PACER access 
requires user authentication through the use of a log-in and password.  
 
 7. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 12 (2009), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/
AdministrativeOffice/DirectorAnnualReport/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/Ann
ualReport/2009/includes/annualReport2009_screenResolution.pdf. 
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Usage information is collected and stored, as set forth in the PACER 
privacy and security notice on our website, as well as the PACER log-in 
banner.  This provides a deterrent to those who would use PACER to obtain 
information for nefarious purposes.  I can tell you that the Administrative 
Office does respond promptly to subpoenas for information on PACER 
usage.  Information that we have provided has been used quite effectively in 
the courts. 
The judiciary proactively works to strike a reasonable, reasoned balance 
between providing public access to court files and protecting sensitive 
information, as evidenced by the evolution of national policies, federal 
rules, and procedures over the years.  We have not done so in a vacuum.  
We seek expert advice and input from all the various interested parties—
especially all of you here today—which, as we have already heard today, 
are often seeking different, sometimes mutually exclusive outcomes.  On a 
personal note, I will let you know that this is just the type of territory—
fraught, ongoing, seemingly intractable issue—that a former diplomat really 
relishes. 
Our efforts to inform the public of our policies, rules, and procedures 
extend to the Internet.  We have published extensively at the following 
website:  www.privacy.uscourts.gov. 
In the interest of time, I would like to summarize just a few of the more 
recent steps that have been taken to protect sensitive information, while 
preserving a high level of public access to which we are committed. 
In 2003, CM/ECF was modified so that only the last four digits of the 
Social Security number can be seen on the docket report in PACER.  In 
May 2007, the Forms Working Group, comprising judges and clerks of 
court, reviewed over 500 national forms to ensure that they did not require 
personal-identifier information.8  Although, as Judge Morris pointed out 
earlier, there is still work to be done, we only found six forms which 
required that information, and those forms were revised or modified to 
delete those fields. 
Last August, the courts were asked to implement a new release of 
CM/ECF that was specifically designed to heighten the awareness of the 
filer’s requirement to redact.  The CM/ECF log-in screen now contains a 
notice of redaction responsibility and provides links to the federal rules on 
privacy.  CM/ECF users must check a box acknowledging the requirement 
to comply with the rules in order to complete the log-in process.  CM/ECF 
also displays another reminder to redact each and every time a document is 
filed.9  Judging from the complaints we have received, these changes have 
certainly served to heighten awareness. 
 
 8. Good Form!  Working Group Restyles, Improves Federal Court Forms, THE THIRD 
BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts), May 2009, at 1, 7, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/TTB/archive/200905%20May.pdf?page=1#page=1. 
 9. News Item:  Notice Enhanced for Redaction Responsibilities, U.S. COURTS (July 27, 
2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/09-07-27/Notice_Enhanced_for_
Redaction_Responsibilities.aspx. 
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The judiciary continually seeks to expand public access.  An important 
initiative to do so was approved by the Judicial Conference last month.  
Namely, the Digital Audio Pilot, which provides access to audio files of 
court hearings through PACER, was approved for national 
implementation.10  During the pilot phase of this initiative, a major concern 
was assuring that personal information not be made available to the public 
through the audio files.  Eight courts participated in the pilot, including the 
Nebraska and Pennsylvania Eastern District Courts, as well as the North 
Carolina Eastern, Maine, Alabama Northern, Rhode Island, and New York 
Eastern and New York Southern Bankruptcy Courts.  Each of the pilot 
courts warned lawyers and litigants, in a variety of ways, not to introduce 
personal identifiers nor to ask questions which would elicit personal 
identifiers unless absolutely necessary.  Lawyers and litigants were also 
warned that they could and should request that recorded proceedings that 
include information covered by the privacy rules or other sensitive matters 
not be posted.  Of course, the presiding judge ultimately determines which 
audio files should be posted. 
A word on the use of software to redact.  Algorithms can and have been 
developed to identify Social Security numbers, and they are effective in 
most, but certainly not all, cases.  Unfortunately, it is far more difficult, and 
in some instances not presently possible, to develop algorithms to identify 
other types of sensitive information, such as the name of a minor, which, I 
would argue, is far more sensitive in nature than a Social Security number.  
Be that as it may, technology is a wonderful tool.  I know—we use it 
liberally.  But it is not a fail-safe, and it is certainly not an adequate 
substitute for filer vigilance with respect to protecting sensitive information 
from disclosure. 
I think it is fair to say that the judiciary’s national and court-based 
efforts, which you will be hearing more about shortly, appear to be having 
the desired effect, as illustrated by the Federal Judicial Center’s excellent 
study.  We really took heart that, of the ten million recently filed documents 
that the researchers reviewed, less than .03% were found to contain Social 
Security numbers.  Of those, 17% had a readily apparent basis for a waiver.  
Upon further scrutiny, we believe that we will find more documents that 
qualify for the waiver for pro se litigants.  All in all, this is very valuable 
information, and we will use the results of the study to zero in on lapses and 
address them. 
Thank you. 
JUDGE LEIGHTON:  Thank you, Michel. 
Our next presenter is Professor Edward Felten.  He is the Director of the 
Center for Information Technology Policy and Professor of Computer 
Science and Public Affairs at Princeton University.  His research on topics 
such as web security, copyright and copy protection, and electronic voting 
 
 10. News Item:  Judiciary Approves PACER Innovations To Enhance Public Access, 
U.S. COURTS (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/10-03-
16/Judiciary_Approves_PACER_Innovations_To_Enhance_Public_Access.aspx. 
50 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
has been covered extensively in the popular press.  In 2004, Scientific 
American magazine named him to its list of fifty worldwide science and 
technology leaders.  Professor Felten. 
PROF. FELTEN:  Thanks. 
I would like to respectfully challenge the standard narrative about this 
issue.  The standard narrative is that there is a longstanding tension between 
transparency and privacy, and that technology makes this worse.  I would 
like to argue that technology can be our friend on these issues, in two ways.  
First, advanced technology can help us to address the privacy challenges we 
face.  Second, advanced technology increases the benefits of openness. 
First, we can use advanced technology to help address the privacy 
challenges.  We have already seen an example of this earlier in the session, 
with the study of how many Social Security numbers are present in 
documents.  That is a valuable step.  Of course, Social Security numbers, as 
Michel said, are probably the easiest case, because there is a very fixed 
pattern that is easy to scan for technically.  It is possible to find and 
automatically redact Social Security numbers in a lot of cases. 
But I believe that technology can be pushed a lot farther to help identify 
failures to redact, not as a replacement for human attention, but to augment 
it.  There are some simple things we can do, and some more technologically 
advanced things.  As an example of a simple practice, if a particular name 
or piece of information is redacted in one case document, but not in another, 
a system could flag that fact at the time of filing and alert counsel or the 
court employee who is filing that document to take another look. 
As an example of a more advanced use of technology in these fields, I am 
convinced that advanced machine learning methods can be very valuable in 
helping to find failures to redact, even for difficult types of information, 
such as names of minor children.  This is a topic on which we have ongoing 
research at Princeton, and we are hoping to be in a position to talk about 
positive results soon. 
So I believe that we can do a lot to help find redactions that are done 
wrong, and I think there is a lot that can be done in terms of how the system 
is structured and how users interact with it in order to make it more evident 
when certain kinds of sensitive information is available. 
I would also like to talk about some of the benefits of transparency, of 
putting documents out there for people to use.  The kind of research that I 
was talking about into machine learning, the kind of research into different 
interfaces, as well as research about the extent of privacy problems in the 
documents of the sort that we have been doing, is only possible because we 
do have access to a large number of documents.  We have assembled a 
corpus of about two million documents by a variety of lawful means that 
has served to enable our research.  But many people who are itching to do 
constructive research along these lines have been held back by lack of 
access to documents.  It is simply not feasible to buy two million 
documents from PACER.  That would cost too much money, as well as not 
really being feasible even to download them all.  So access to documents 
has a lot of value. 
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Indeed, there are many new types of constructive and valuable research 
which will become possible when documents are available to researchers in 
bulk.  This includes research on issues of direct interest to the judiciary, 
such as questions of judicial workload and case management, historical and 
journalistic research to look at global pictures and trends across the entire 
judicial system, as well as development of new tools for improved legal 
research.  I am convinced that if and when a large quantity of court 
documents becomes available to the great minds of Silicon Valley, we will 
see great new ideas, improved ways of doing legal research that really put 
the sort of technology that has enabled companies like Google to succeed to 
work on the specific problems of lawyers and legal researchers.  I think 
there is a lot that can be done in that area, but it is not quite possible today 
because information and documents are not as available as they could be. 
If the judiciary is going to move ahead toward a system that is more open 
and makes more documents available, the next logical question is how best 
to enable positive uses of those documents of the sorts that I described.  
From the viewpoint of researchers looking to use these documents, there are 
really two things that we would like to see. 
First, we would like to see bulk access to the raw documents.  There is no 
substitute for actually having the data on which your study is going to 
operate. 
Second, I would argue for authentication of the documents by using a 
technology such as digital signatures, which is a kind of electronic seal of 
authenticity put on a document.  The advantage of doing that is that it 
makes it self-evident that the document is authentic, regardless of from 
whom you received it.  That makes it possible for, say, a commercial 
service to provide a document to a working lawyer.  The lawyer can be sure 
that the document is authentic because it bears the digital signature of the 
Administrative Office of the courts or some other authoritative body. 
I think there is a lot to learn, actually, from other branches of government 
which do face, not the same, but similar kinds of issues in balancing 
transparency against cases where information should legitimately be 
withheld.  The executive branch and the legislative branch have been 
working through these issues, on a larger scale in some respects than the 
judiciary has.  I think there is a significant amount to be learned there. 
Finally, on this question of how best to enable access for positive use, let 
me just put in a brief plug for our paper on this topic, called Government 
Data and the Invisible Hand, which appeared in the Yale Journal of Law & 
Technology, Volume 11, last year.11 
Thank you. 
JUDGE LEIGHTON:  Thank you, Professor. 
Our next speaker is Judge Elizabeth Stong.  Judge Stong has served as a 
United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern District of New York, one 
of the pilot-project districts, since 2003.  Before taking the bench, she was a 
 
 11. David Robinson, Harlan Yu, William P. Zeller & Edward W. Felten, Government 
Data and the Invisible Hand, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 160 (2009). 
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litigation partner and associate at Willkie Farr & Gallagher in New York 
and associate at Cravath, Swaine & Moore and law clerk to the Honorable 
David Mazzone, U.S. District Judge in the District of Massachusetts. 
Judge Stong. 
JUDGE STONG:  Thank you so much.  Thank you especially to 
Professor Capra and Judge Raggi and Judge Rosenthal for convening this 
and for inviting me to participate. 
It has been quite an interesting experience to step back and look at these 
issues systematically and from the special window that we have on personal 
information in the bankruptcy process.  What we look at in the bankruptcy 
arena is the most personal detailed information about an individual’s 
situation that you can imagine.  We do it at a point where they have come to 
the bankruptcy process for a fresh start, probably because something bad 
has happened—for whatever reason, not at a high point, but at a 
comparative low point in their lives. 
So the question we are looking at is not like the question of the prior 
panel—whether to redact, what the tradeoffs are—because that decision 
was made back in 2003 when the bankruptcy process adapted to the need, 
the requirement, to get Social Security number information out of our 
public documents, at about the same time that we were going, universally 
throughout the system, in the bankruptcy courts in the United States, to 
electronic filing, electronic access to information. 
So think about where this puts us.  Disclosure drives our process.  The 
kind of disclosure you see in a bankruptcy case is unlike anything I saw in 
my prior life as a big-case litigator.  You can file a class action against the 
biggest company in America.  You do not have to tell much of anybody 
much of anything about who you are.  If you file an individual bankruptcy 
case, as 1.4 million consumers did last year, and you need to disclose your 
name, your address, your dependents by age, though not by name, where 
you work, where you used to work, how much you make, who you owe 
money to, what you own.  I have seen debtors take this so literally as to 
itemize the things in their closets.  It is a pretty intrusive process. 
Access to this information is critical—access for courts, access for 
creditors, access for the trustees assigned in the case, access of the Office of 
the United States Trustee, part of the Department of Justice charged with 
the very important job of seeing if there is abuse of the bankruptcy system 
taking place.  So you have broad disclosure by individuals.  You have broad 
access to that information.  And we put it all on the Internet.  We have put it 
on the Internet because, as of 2003, in every single bankruptcy court, every 
single document, whether filed by a lawyer or filed pro se, winds up 
electronically accessible.  This is, for many practitioners in the field, a 
volume practice. 
I think and I assume—and I am generally gratified in this thought and 
assumption—that every lawyer who files a document with a federal court 
does it with the care and attention it requires and deserves.  But it also 
happens from time to time that somebody has one too many cases to get 
filed that day, maybe in a bit of a hurry—it is a volume practice sometimes.  
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Of those 1.4 million consumer cases that were filed last year, a certain 
number of them, filed by counsel, may nevertheless not have received 
precisely the attention we would like to see, and, yes, occasionally a 
mistake does happen. 
I have to tell you, I was extremely interested in seeing the numbers 
uncovered by the study—ten million documents.  This is taking me back to 
my days as a litigator, when we did document review in big cases, antitrust 
clearance, things like that.  I was both heartened and concerned to see the 
number of documents in which Social Security numbers still appear.  I was 
not surprised to see that we in the bankruptcy world have a certain number 
of those on our watch—2244 of the 2899.  I was struck to see that filing pro 
se is an exemption.  When I see a pro se, I sometimes see someone who has 
already been victimized in one way and may well be victimized by not 
having a lawyer in a very complicated process, if the court process does not 
attend to the needs of that case. 
So you take these competing factors that affect nearly every bankruptcy 
case—the need for disclosure, the need for access, the fact of electronic 
filing—and you get a bit of a perfect storm against which to apply a 
criterion that I think we universally understand should be as close to perfect 
compliance as we can get.  Remember what comes along with an 
inadvertently included Social Security number:  a name, a home address, a 
mailing address if it is different, employment, a record of every debt that 
person owes.  This is a portfolio of information designed to facilitate 
identity theft.  So you attach that also to a Social Security number, and you 
have your next perfect storm.  Imagine the risks.  Imagine the problems. 
Now, you are going to say, is identity theft really such a problem for 
people who file bankruptcy?  Is that the kind of identity people want to steal 
in the credit world?  I am here to tell you, it happens.  It happens.  And it is 
a problem.  Then you have again victimized somebody who has come to the 
court process for relief, relief for the honest but unfortunate debtor. 
So what do we do in our court?  First of all, I think we are grateful every 
time we see a properly redacted document.  And they usually do come in 
that way.  The statistics are consistent with our experience.  I embrace this 
notion, mentioned in the prior panel, of informal, anecdotal, empirical 
research.  I think that must be a professor’s way to say, asking around, 
which is what I did.  It sounds a lot better. 
I will tell you that in our court we do not see a widespread problem.  But 
it does not need to be a widespread problem in order to be a problem.  
When attorneys miss this, they create a potential issue; if it is not caught, it 
will live on that docket indefinitely.  What we see anecdotally, as we follow 
up on these situations—when they are identified, for example, through the 
quality-control process that our wonderful Clerk’s Office staff undertakes 
with every document filed electronically—it seems that most of the time 
this is a situation of staff in an attorney’s office filing a document, with 
attorney supervision, but not at the level and with the guidance that we 
would like to see.  And so a mistake happens. 
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How do we follow up with this?  We have electronic filing training.  We 
make it available to attorneys, but we invite staff to participate as well.  We 
have a wide-open door to this training, and the more it is used, the better, 
from our perspective.  Retraining is available too.  These are complicated 
procedures, and if you do not use them every day, you should come back.  
We welcome that.  We encourage it.  We promote it, and not in a punitive 
way. 
When we see it as a problem, it sometimes traces to staff.  We 
immediately contact, through the Clerk’s Office, the filing office and get a 
redacted document on the docket, and the unredacted document is taken 
down. 
When you go into CM/ECF to file a document, as you have heard, you 
have to specifically check and click through a screen that acknowledges that 
you know you need to redact this information.  Do we all check something 
and click through every time?  I was recently away and clicked through to 
use a hotel’s Internet access.  Did I scroll down to the bottom and say, yes, I 
had seen the policy? 
But I think it still serves a useful purpose.  Every time filers log into 
CM/ECF, they are required to acknowledge that they are aware of this 
policy or they cannot go further in logging in and filing their documents. 
We also try to remind people in other ways.  We have an ECF newsletter.  
It is surprisingly interesting reading.  I mean that.  It is written in a short 
narrative way, kind of fun—how many documents have been filed?  And 
we put reminders, again in a prose way—not just a policy, not just as a 
teaching thing, but reminders and information about the importance of 
complying with the requirement to redact Social Security numbers—not our 
court’s policy, but a fundamental policy of the Judicial Conference. 
Sometimes if we see a problem come up more than once with an 
attorney’s office, the staff will really reach out to that office and try to get to 
the right staff people and invite them to come in.  If they are having a 
problem or they have a question about our procedures, we want to hear 
from them, to make our procedures better. 
Finally, it happens—and it is rare, I will say once or twice every two or 
three months—that we see a document in chambers or in court containing 
unredacted personal identifier information, often by a pro se, sometimes in 
the supporting documents filed with a proof of claim, which is what a 
creditor files, together with original documents that have been scanned, 
describing why they should get a payment in a bankruptcy case.  If we see it 
in chambers, we are promptly responsive, either through our courtroom 
deputy in my own chambers, down to the Clerk’s Office, to be sure that the 
problem is fixed.  That is an informal procedure.  It is a question that comes 
up rarely enough that that kind of direct intervention seems to be a practical 
solution, and a solution that gets the attorney’s attention.  Nothing like a 
call from the Clerk’s Office or from the courtroom deputy to say, “We see 
something we are concerned about.  Can you please fix this, and fix it 
promptly?  Thank you so much.” 
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It has worked.  We have not yet established a system to impose a 
consequence or a penalty.  I do not believe it has ever been the case that we 
have been required to take away someone’s filing privileges, for example, 
and I expect it will not come to that.  It would take an extraordinary amount 
of noncompliance, I think, for us to go to that level. 
I will end with this.  This reminds me a little bit of something I learned 
growing up in the San Francisco Bay Area, where we were never done 
painting the Golden Gate Bridge.  You sanded it and painted it in one 
direction; and then you turned around and you started in the other direction.  
Once the decision is made, in whatever court, that information of this nature 
needs to be redacted from documents, but needs otherwise to be available to 
some participants in the process, just like the Golden Gate Bridge, you are 
never done reinforcing the need to comply.  As a court, we should never 
consider ourselves done with the enterprise of making compliance as easy 
as possible, as plain as possible from a procedural standpoint, and as 
comprehensive as possible, because even one mistake, given the potential 
consequences, is a mistake we should not tolerate. 
Thanks very much. 
JUDGE LEIGHTON:  Judge Stong, thank you very much. 
 Our next presenter is Jay Safer.  Jay is a partner at Locke Lord Bissell & 
Liddell’s New York office.  He counsels clients on commercial matters, 
including protection and preventive measures, the creation of risk litigation 
plans, e-signature, e-discovery, e-readiness, and pre-litigation analysis. 
 Jay? 
 MR. SAFER:  Thank you, Judge.  I recently had the opportunity to 
participate on a committee, which helped draft a proposed rule for the state 
courts on how to deal with private, sensitive information about individuals.  
It has to be remembered what we all recognize—that never have so many 
documents been so available to the general public that are filed with courts 
electronically.  The FTC identity theft page12 estimates that nine million 
Americans have their identity stolen each year.13  In the federal courts, you 
have Rule 5.2,14 which has been discussed in part.  I will get to that in a 
second. 
But think about how you would write a rule and what you would put 
in it.  What information would you deem to be appropriate to tell an 
attorney not to put in papers?  How would you tell that attorney so that 
it was effective, in having the attorney understand and follow the rule?  
What should be the enforcement of that rule?  Who should be checking 
the documents?  Should it be a clerk of the court?  Should it be the judge?  
What information should be precluded, and should the rule be mandatory? 
The federal court Rule 5.2, as I said, has selected information.  It has 
Social Security numbers, as you know.  It has taxpayer-identification 
 
 12. About Identity Theft, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/
bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/consumers/about-identity-theft.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
 13. Id. 
 14. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2. 
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numbers, birth date, the name of an individual known to be a minor, and 
financial-account numbers.15  I want you to try to remember that. 
Briefly in my time, I want you to compare what is now happening in the 
state courts with the federal rule.  Keep in mind that in the state courts the 
general public has access now to almost all documents.  First of all, while e-
filing is not required in state courts specifically, once you get into the New 
York State Commercial Division, e-filing becomes, in effect, a 
presumption.  A new proposed rule under legislation in New York State16 
will require e-filing in certain counties.  Thus, any case involving 
commercial matters in New York County, Nassau County tort cases, and 
one other county and type of case to be selected, will be e-filed. 
But even putting aside e-filing, what they are doing in the state courts is 
scanning all documents that are filed.  You can imagine, with all the 
documents being filed, how much is going to be available to the general 
public.  All you have to do as a member of the general public is go to 
various links to the court website; www.nycourts.gov is the main website.  
There is specifically a link that is the Supreme Court Records On-line 
Library.17  It is called SCROLL. 
What it does is make available to the general public all these documents.  
However, the state of New York, unlike the federal courts, has no statewide 
unifying court rule on how to deal with sensitive information.  It has a 
scattering here, a scattering there.  A statewide rule was proposed in 2006.  
It did not go forward. 
So in sitting around looking at this, the first question was, how do you 
deal with what information?  At the New York City Bar Association, I am 
Chair of the Council on Judicial Administration, and we had a 
subcommittee dealing with this, consisting of a wide range of people:  Steve 
Kayman, who was a lawyer; Judge Silbermann, a former administrative 
judge; Karen Milton, who is the Circuit Executive of the Second Circuit, 
and others.  We prepared a report proposing nine types of information that 
would require exclusion in their entirety:  Social Security numbers, 
taxpayer ID numbers, bank and other financial-account numbers, passport 
numbers, driver’s license numbers, government-issued ID numbers, other 
identification numbers which uniquely identify an individual, names of 
minor children, and dates of birth.  The rule would be mandatory. 
This report is named the Report Recommending a New York State Court 
Rule Requiring that Sensitive Personal Information Be Omitted or Redacted 
from Documents Filed with Civil Courts.18  The report is available at 
www.nycbar.org, Reports of the Council on Judicial Administration. 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Act of Aug. 31, 2009, ch. 416, 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1140–42 (McKinney). 
 17. See Supreme Court Records On-Line Library, THE COUNTY CLERK AND SUP. CT. OF 
N.Y. COUNTY, http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/iscroll/index.jsp (last visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
 18. SUBCOMM. ON ELEC. COURT RECORDS, COUNCIL ON JUDICIAL ADMIN., REPORT 
RECOMMENDING A NEW YORK STATE COURT RULE REQUIRING THAT SENSITIVE PERSONAL 
INFORMATION BE OMITTED OR REDACTED FROM DOCUMENTS FILED WITH CIVIL COURT 
(2010), available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071821-Report
RegardingNeedtoProtectSensitiveInformationFromIdentityTheft.pdf. 
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In doing the report, we looked at other states.  Fifteen other states have 
rules on access, based on what you file.  But they are all different.  Looking 
at these nine types of information, one issue we looked at was whether if, 
for good cause, you needed to use such information, certain portions of the 
numbers, such as the four last digits of Social Security, could be included.  
But in looking at this and trying to decide whether a clerk should have the 
responsibility to look at this issue, we said the clerks have so much to do 
that it should not be their responsibility.  It should be the responsibility of 
the attorney. 
Then the question came up, should this be an ethical violation?  The 
feeling was that it was just too hard to have it as an ethical violation, and it 
should be set forth as a court rule. 
Then the question was, do you have other types of information, like 
email addresses, which you should include in the rule?  But it was felt that 
the nine types of information contained the most sensitive information. 
I sent the report with a letter to Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman of the 
New York State Court of Appeals and Chief Administrative Judge Anne 
Pfau.  It was then sent to the Civil Practice Law and Rules Advisory 
Committee, on which I am fortunate also to be a member. 
The CPLR Advisory Committee has now sent to the Administrative 
Board of the State of New York a modified version of what we proposed at 
the City Bar.  Interestingly, the Advisory Committee took a much stronger 
view.  They said it is not enough information.  There should be more 
information excluded. 
They have recommended the following exclusions:  Social Security 
numbers, telephone numbers, date of birth, driver’s license numbers, non-
driver photo identification card numbers, employee identification numbers, 
mothers’ maiden names, insurance and financial account numbers, demand 
deposit account numbers, savings account numbers, credit card numbers, 
computer password information, electronic signature data or unique 
biometric data, such as a fingerprint, voiceprint, retinol image, iris image, 
medical procedure, diagnosis, or billing codes. 
That is a lot.  But the CPLR Advisory Committee said, “We want to 
protect sensitive information.  And we want to make it mandatory.”  It said 
the courts should have the ultimate responsibility to determine whether 
something should be removed, and they have the ability to do that upon 
motion if this issue is contested.  Matrimonial litigations were excluded. 
One area that may need a modification is consumer debt cases.  On a 
number of occasions, with sewer service, people buy debt, and they sue 
people.  Those defendants, if you require certain information be excluded, 
will not have the ability to know whether they are really being sued for 
something they did.  It has been requested in those cases that, for example, 
the last four digits of Social Security numbers be allowed. 
Another point is that, when you are looking at this and you are realizing 
all the issues that come up, there are also certain people—fairly—who say, 
“Wait a minute.  We have a First Amendment right to have access to 
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information.  We want to have access and that there be as little restriction as 
possible.” 
So what is going to happen now, I think, we will know in the next few 
months, hopefully.  Will the Administrative Board approve this?  If they do, 
it will be the first time in New York State that there will be a statewide rule 
for which attorneys will be responsible for excluding certain sensitive 
information when filing their papers with the court. 
Thank you. 
JUDGE LEIGHTON:  Jay, thank you. 
Our next speaker comes from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York.  Robert Heinemann is the Clerk of that court.  He has 
held that position since 1983.  Before that, he was a Chief Deputy Clerk and 
pro se staff attorney.  He received his J.D. from Brooklyn Law School and 
his A.B. from Fordham University.  He has received the Director’s Award 
for Outstanding Leadership from the Administrative Office of United States 
Courts. 
Mr. Heinemann. 
MR. HEINEMANN:  Thank you, and I want to thank Judge Raggi for 
inviting me to this discussion. 
As a Clerk of Court, I have a more general perspective about this.  First, I 
am very aware that I am a public information officer between the court and 
the public.  At the same time, I am also aware that I have to be a gatekeeper, 
a temporary gatekeeper.  I want to underline the word “temporary,” in 
deference to the press, because I also am a public information officer who 
responds to press inquiries. 
I think the Internet is really our helper here, although it has been a hard 
way to get there at times.  I agree with what was said earlier in another 
panel—I think it was by Judge Morris—that scanned documents are 
problematic.  I would much rather always have an electronic document.  I 
think electronic documents are easier to seal temporarily or completely, if it 
is done appropriately, and limited to certain views by parties and by the 
court. It is also easy to unseal an electronic document. 
The flip side of all of this—and I think courts do a very, very good job in 
the criminal area and sometimes a less good job in the civil area—is in 
unsealing documents.  When people are indicted before they have been 
arrested or there is a safety or security issue, for a very brief period of time, 
that information or indictment is sealed.  As soon as that person is arrested 
or the reason for sealing it is gone, almost immediately the court directs the 
clerk to unseal. 
I think that happens less often in civil litigation, where there is more of a 
desire on the part of one or more of the parties to seal a settlement 
agreement or to seal some corporate information.  I am not talking about 
patents or other matters that often may need to be sealed and stay sealed.  I 
think courts can do better in terms of unsealing civil cases. 
But there are a lot of practical issues.  I will not go over what was put in 
my statement, except briefly. 
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We have to comply with the federal rules.  In each district, it is important 
to have local rules of policy.  The Eastern District of New York has them. 
It should be transparent why a document is being sealed, and there should 
be an order of approval to seal it by the court.  I think the form we have 
developed in Eastern New York is useful for that purpose. 
It also is very important—and here is where the problem comes in—to 
always use that form or to always make it clear why a document needs to be 
sealed, however briefly, or if it is the rare case that may have to have a 
longer-term seal.  That is where human error comes in.  We have to do our 
best, as public servants and as members of other agencies of the 
government, to limit that human error, and as members of the bar. 
A core question for this committee may be:  who ultimately is 
responsible to be a backstop to seal or unseal, or for redaction?  I certainly 
do not think it should be the Clerk’s Office in the first instance, but maybe 
it should be the Clerk’s Office in the last instance.  Attorneys do get busy; 
attorneys will make errors.  The U.S. Attorney’s Office will make errors.  
The Clerk’s Office will make errors.  But at some point, since this area is so 
important in terms of privacy and, in criminal cases, protection and safety, 
someone has to be accountable as a backstop.  That will not make human 
errors zero, but it will certainly make errors less likely because there is 
another pair of eyes looking at it. 
That brings me to another point that I touched upon in the statement.  I 
think we need more help with the software in terms of flagging potential 
areas where something should have been sealed that may have been missed.  
We do have quality-control deputies.  That is a very important role now.  
The Clerk’s Office has changed tremendously over the last ten years, going 
from a very paper-intensive office—we will always have paper, but where 
every item was paper—to now, where everything is potentially on the 
Internet that is filed by an attorney, very quickly.  That is the beauty and I 
think it is a help, but it is also something that needs very careful control and 
monitoring. 
To the extent that the Administrative Office can provide us with 
additional software tools—the Office does a great job right now, but if we 
can have some additional search that might be done to limit or to flag 
certain categories of docketing that we would look at more closely, since 
we have so many thousands of docket entries to look at in every situation—
that would be very helpful. 
Another obvious point is that courts can have local rules on a variety of 
matters, and they do—courts need to have them—and they can have local 
policy, but even with changed federal rules of procedure, I think it takes a 
good two to three years before the practicing bar really, in general, gets 
very familiar with those federal rules of procedure and starts to use them 
daily and uniformly and are aware of them.  This means that Clerk’s Offices 
have to do much more to be proactive, to put more on our website, to flag 
things in ways that make it available and right under the nose of counsel.  If 
it takes two to three years for counsel, with all due respect, to get really 
familiar with the federal rule, imagine how much longer it takes counsel 
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and the Clerk’s Office and other government agencies to get familiar with 
local rules of policy, or administrative orders, which often are the most 
effective and efficient way to do something quickly, but also may be the 
least well known or well understood.  So we have to use our public websites 
to call attention to policy changes in a very proactive way, in a way that you 
see it immediately as to what is new on your website, as soon as that 
administrative order goes out there, or policy or procedure or form. 
So those are some of the things that I think Clerk’s Offices can do to help 
the court police these matters, which are only really policed in the short 
term and only in maybe one or two percent of filed matters, before they are 
once again, in most instances, open to the public. 
Thank you. 
JUDGE LEIGHTON:  Thank you, Mr. Heinemann. 
Our final speaker is Joe Goldstein.  He is a freelance reporter and former 
courts reporter for The New York Sun.  He is currently working on a project 
for ProPublica, a nonprofit investigative newsroom. 
Mr. Goldstein. 
MR. GOLDSTEIN:  Hi.  About the only thing I am qualified to talk 
about here is how reporters actually use electronically filed documents. 
I used to have a desk in the U.S. courthouse in Brooklyn, when I was 
writing for The New York Sun.  I figured that most of my stories would be 
based on courtroom events that I had actually witnessed—trials, 
arraignments, and sentencings.  On occasion, the courthouse will have a 
good trial, and that will keep the reporters nourished for a couple of weeks.  
But I was struck that there is a lot less courtroom action than we might 
actually expect.  Criminal prosecutions, even the good ones, generally end 
in plea deals, and none of the evidence that the prosecutors have amassed 
ever comes out in open court. 
The point here is that a robust right of public access to the courts needs to 
encompass more than just the right to sit in on court when there is a judge 
on the bench.  Reporters rely very heavily on PACER to figure out what is 
actually going on.  A huge share of what we write about comes from 
documents filed electronically, attachments to those documents, and the 
like. 
I am trying to think of an example to illustrate this.  You may remember 
the name of Russell Defreitas, who was indicted on charges of trying to 
blow up part of JFK Airport.19  The case broke in June 2007, and he has 
been in court a handful of times since then.  Certainly the case is still going 
on, and very little has actually emerged in open court.  But if you log on to 
PACER and run a docket search, you will see that, as of last night, there 
were 192 motions and letters that have been filed.  You can bet that most of 
the reporters in the Eastern District have read every single word of that.  It 
is really from that that they are able to follow one of the more important 
cases that is currently winding through that courthouse. 
 
 19. Cara Buckley & William K. Rashbaum, 4 Men Accused of Plot to Blow Up Kennedy 
Airport Terminals and Fuel Lines, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2007, at 37. 
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I am unclear on what proposals, if any, are on the table to further redact 
court records, to seal additional court records.  But I would like to say I am 
probably against it. 
From this spectator’s point of view, one of the main functions of courts is 
to pry sensitive, personal information from people.  This is not an incidental 
function; this is what courts do.  Much of what emerges in proceedings or in 
attachments filed on PACER does contain sensitive information, terribly 
private information, people’s darkest secrets.  The public has a right to 
know, and this information ought to very much be in the public domain. 
At the sentencing of a murderer, for instance, a widow might talk about 
how this has traumatized her children.  Just because the names of minors 
are disclosed, that does not mean that the transcript ought to be reflexively 
redacted or sealed.  A defendant who does not want to go to prison for the 
rest of his life may tell the court a tale of woe about his ill health.  He may 
provide medical records.  He may provide psychological records.  He may 
talk about abuse that he suffered as a child.  Just because that is sensitive 
medical information does not mean that it should be reflexively sealed or 
kept private.  It will factor into the sentence that the court makes, and the 
public ought to have a right to inspect the factual bases of that sentence. 
There seems to be a concern that information filed electronically will be 
used for nefarious purposes.  I believe that we have heard that there are 
instances of identity theft from bankruptcy proceedings.  I am not very 
familiar with that, but I would like to know about instances in which we 
know that information filed on PACER or filed electronically has been used 
to do wrong.  I want more than just sort of an undifferentiated fear. 
I have read in the past about concerns that criminals will use electronic 
access to courts to access information about potential cooperators and 
coconspirators and use it for purposes of witness intimidation.  I am not 
aware of any such cases.  Maybe they do exist.  But I think the courts 
should have a couple in hand before they act on that fear. 
I do not want to be too provocative, but I will say that last year in 
Brooklyn an attorney was sentenced for trying to facilitate hits on a couple 
of witnesses.  A defense attorney in New Jersey was indicted on a similar 
sort of thing just last year.  My hunch—and I do not know for sure—is that 
defendants who want to use information that comes out in court to kill off 
those who might testify against them are generally getting their sources of 
information from discovery or from confidential information that never gets 
filed publicly.  So I would caution against just being worried that the public 
has access to motions and the like that are filed electronically, and that that 
would suggest that some of this information might be used to intimidate 
witnesses and the like. 
I would just like to close by saying that, especially in the civil context, a 
lot of documents are already filed under seal.  Documents that could simply 
be redacted are instead just filed under seal.  There has been talk about 
needing a backstop to make sure that Social Security numbers and other 
identifying information is not filed on PACER.  The backstop that I am 
interested in seeing is a backstop of judges and court officials who make 
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sure that attorneys engaged in civil litigation are not just filing documents 
under seal because it is more convenient and they would rather litigate 
privately than let the public have access.  My hunch is that a good portion 
of the documents that are filed under seal need not be. 
I will close with that. 
JUDGE LEIGHTON:  Joe, thank you.  Does anybody have a question? 
Judge Stong talked about the need to search for perfection here because 
the stakes are so high for some folks, particularly in bankruptcy.  Yet we 
have an exemption for pro se filers.  I have been told that 40% of the cases 
in the Ninth Circuit have a pro se participant, twenty-five percent in the 
Western District of Washington, where I am from. 
Should we be doing something for those folks?  And if so, what? 
JUDGE STONG:  As a practitioner, I can assure you that none of my 
clients was ever pro se.  But moving to my role and my perspective in a 
bankruptcy court, where both debtors and creditors and other parties of 
interest may file pro se, I do not see a reduced risk of harm to people who 
do not have a lawyer in their Social Security number being electronically 
accessible in the docket.  However you give effect to that concern, I do not 
see a principled basis to make a distinction in the kind of harm you are 
trying to avoid.  
It is a lot easier to have a framework to instruct lawyers and require 
lawyers, for example, who file electronically—unlike pro se litigants, who 
bring paper to the counter, which is scanned—to base your requirements on 
that system.  I would not want to create administrative traps for uninformed 
people trying to navigate a sufficiently complex process already by 
somehow creating impediments to the ability to file a case. 
But I think your concern is spot-on.  There is no difference whatsoever—
in fact, maybe even more harm could be done to self-represented people 
through the inadvertent inclusion of Social Security numbers on the 
documents they file in the case.  I certainly make no distinction if I see a 
Social Security number in the docket, based on whether the debtor has an 
attorney.  If I see it in something that is handed up in court, if I see it on a 
proof of claim, we attend to it the same way. 
I have taken the spirit, if not the letter, of the Judicial Conference policy 
and the requirements that we implement through CM/ECF to be that this 
information should not be publicly available.  How we do it is through the 
requirements we impose on lawyers, through CM/ECF and otherwise.  Why 
we do it, I think, would make no difference whatsoever whether there is a 
lawyer or not. 
So I think I am agreeing with you. 
JUDGE LEIGHTON:  Professor, last word. 
PROF. FELTEN:  I think there are some things that can be done 
technologically to help pro se filers avoid mistakes of this sort, to scan their 
filings and be a little more aggressive about pointing out possible problems.  
As well, if you can ask them to fill out up front a fairly simple form—that 
might depend on the type of case they have—in which they explicitly list 
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information—for example, in a bankruptcy case, information about their 
Social Security number and bank accounts—that could help to target a 
technological scan for information that ought to be redacted, which can then 
either be done for them or can be suggested. 
JUDGE STONG:  I will just note that the number is nine, nine Social 
Security numbers that were found in those documents that were reviewed in 
pro se papers.  My speculation is that every single paper that comes in—and 
I do mean paper—at the Clerk’s Office is reviewed for this purpose.  That is 
the only way I can imagine that we are getting to a number like nine in the 
many pro se papers that are filed. 
JUDGE LEIGHTON:  My thanks to the panel. 
 
 
